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Abstract
This article explores the complex relationship between family firms and talent man-
agement practices. We use an international sample of medium-sized manufacturing 
firms to show that the relationship between family-owned firms and investment in 
talent management practices is mediated by the firm’s level of risk aversion, which 
is, in turn, moderated by industry competition. Risk-averse family-owned firms tend 
to invest less in talent management practices when industry competition is weak. In 
contrast, when competition increases, family-owned firms tend to invest in talent as 
much as non-family-owned firms do.
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1 Introduction
In a complex global economy, firms must manage talent as a source of competi-
tive advantage (Wright & Kehoe, 2008). Talent management is defined as the set of 
’activities and processes that involve the systematic identification of key positions, 
which differentially contribute to the organisation’s sustainable competitive advan-
tage, the development of a talent pool of high-potential and high-performing incum-
bents to fill these roles, and the development of a differentiated human resource 
architecture to facilitate filling these positions with competent incumbents and to 
ensure their continued commitment to the organisation’ (Collins & Mellahi, 2009, p. 
305). Talent management, decided at the top governance level, is considered a pri-
ority for any organisation (Fegley, 2006) because it increases their competitiveness 
(Chatterjee, 2016), performance (Shaw et al., 2013), and efficiency and productivity 
(Bloom et al., 2014).
When firms recruit, train, and manage talented employees, firms face two agency 
problems: adverse selection (information asymmetry between the employer and the 
applicants) and moral hazard (opportunistic behaviours of the agent once under con-
tract) problems. These problems can be addressed either by incurring investment 
costs related to talent management or by maintaining the status quo and directly 
bearing the associated costs. Talent management practices aim to reduce both the 
traditional type I (principal-agent) agency problems, such as adverse selection and 
moral hazard (Tabor et al., 2018), and the specific agency problems created by fam-
ily generational involvement in the firm, such as nepotism, conflict of family and 
business cultures (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006), and asymmetric altruism (Bernheim 
& Stark, 1988; Chrisman et al., 2004). Career-related issues are far more complex 
in family firms than in non-family firms due to the inextricable link between fam-
ily and business (Baù et  al., 2020). Although empirical evidence shows that fam-
ily firms benefit from implementing formal human resource practices to attract and 
manage talented non-family employees (Chrisman et  al., 2017; Jaskiewicz et  al., 
2017), talent management practices are unevenly distributed across family firms and 
between family and non-family firms (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007; Hauswald et al., 
2016; Memili et al., 2013).
Three main reasons may explain the difference in talent management practice 
between family and non-family firms. First, active supervision by family owners 
may discourage investment in talent management; family ownership may miti-
gate traditional agency problems using alternative practices such as exploiting the 
family social network to recruit potential candidates (Steijivers et al., 2017). Sec-
ond, family ownership may create a family-specific logic, based on nepotism and 
asymmetric altruism, as a substitute for formal human resource practices (Daspit 
et  al., 2017). Finally, family-owned firms may develop a self-perception where 
family-oriented goals could act as negative signals for potential talented candi-
dates. Differences in talent management have relevant consequences for firm per-
formance. For instance, Dal Maso et al. (2020) find that almost half of the nega-
tive relationship between family blockholders and environmental performance is 
mediated by investment in human resource practices. Therefore, the key question 
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is why and when do family firms invest less in talent management? We attempt 
to answer this question using organisational risk literature, an inherent part of 
agency theory.
Organisational risk, defined as ‘income stream uncertainty’ (Palmer & Wiseman, 
1999, p. 1039), depends on idiosyncratic firm characteristics and contingency fac-
tors. Managing talent is risky because firms cannot ex-ante predict a candidate’s 
innate talent (adverse selection problem) or the time the candidate is going to spend 
at the firm (moral hazard problem) (Arrow, 1973; Spence, 1973; Stiglitz, 1975). 
Under uncertain information, due to adverse selection and moral hazard, risk-averse 
firms weigh potential threats more heavily than the potential benefits from investing 
in and implementing talent management practices. Nonetheless, uncertainty should 
be contextualised because exogenous circumstances, such as industry competition, 
may alter the level of uncertainty of a particular event (Govindarajan, 1988; Hiebl, 
2012). The cost of losing highly talented employees is higher when competition is 
high. Arguing that industry competition exacerbates adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems in talent management, we hypothesise that industry competition 
alters the behaviour of risk-averse firms versus risk-neutral firms. When industry 
competition increases, risk-averse firms are more willing to invest in talent manage-
ment as a form of insurance for sustainability and continuity. Because of their idi-
osyncratic firm characteristic (e.g., Daspit et al., 2021), we focus on family-owned 
firms, which tend to be more risk-averse than non-family firms (Block, 2012; Hiebl, 
2012; Morck & Yeung, 2003; Sirmon et al., 2008;). Knowing that talent manage-
ment practices are less effective for non-talented employees, family firms, which are 
on average more risk-averse than non-family ones, are less likely to invest in talent 
management when competition is low. Accordingly, a negative association between 
family ownership and investment in talent management practices, mediated by the 
firm’s level of risk aversion, may be expected in less competitive contexts.
We use the Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) dataset—an international sample 
comprising family-owned and non-family, medium-sized manufacturing firms oper-
ating in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States—to assess 
the mediation–moderation effect. Our results demonstrate that a firm’s level of risk 
aversion negatively mediates the impact of family ownership on talent management 
investment as a managerial decision coming from the top governance level. Specifi-
cally, we show that family-owned firms are more risk-averse than non-family-owned 
ones and that being more risk-averse negatively influences the level of investment in 
talent management. We find that risk aversion is the only reason why, when compe-
tition is low, family-owned firms under-invest in talent management. That is, once 
we account for this mediation effect, no significant differences emerge between fam-
ily and non-family companies. We also show that industry competition moderates 
this relationship. When industry competition is low, family-owned firms invest less 
in talent management practices than non-family-owned firms because of their risk 
aversion. Conversely, when direct competition increases the risk of losing talented 
employees (and thus competitive advantage), family-owned firms invest more in tal-
ent to ensure the firm’s survival, thereby closing the investment gap. Finally, we 
demonstrate that the results apply to both pre- and post-contractual talent manage-
ment practices.
 R. Basco et al.
1 3
Our study contributes to previous research by addressing the call by Wright 
et al. (2014) and Tabor et al. (2018) to better understand the antecedents of invest-
ment in human capital. Our model supports the finding of Memili et al. (2013) that, 
compared with non-family-owned firms, family-owned firms are less likely to offer 
incentives to non-family employees; and explicitly determines that the variations are 
due to firms’ risk aversion and industry competition. Second, our study contributes 
to agency theory by explicitly measuring organisational risk using the inverse of the 
variance of return on capital employed (ROCE). Following Palmer and Wiseman 
(1999), we isolate the owner firm’s characteristics (family ownership) from firms’ 
relative risk aversion. Finally, our results have practical implications, especially for 
policymakers. Recognising the importance and prevalence of family firms across 
regions and countries and knowing that competition triggers risk-averse family 
firms to invest in talent management, there are two alternative policy paths. First, 
policymakers could promote competition which incentivises family-owned firms to 
maintain their competitive edge by improving their managerial practices to attract, 
develop, promote, and retain talented employees. Second, in low-competitive con-
texts, the government must also consider family risk aversion and promote talent 
management investment by assuming a part of the risk.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Sect.  2, we discuss the 
theoretical framework and relate it to the existing literature. Section  3 describes 
the sample, data, and methodology of this study. Finally, we report the results in 
Sect. 4 and discuss the main findings in Sect. 5, along with concluding remarks and 
practical implications (Sect. 6), as well as limitations and scope for future research 
(Sect. 7).
2  Related literature and hypotheses development
In a hypercompetitive and increasingly complex global economy, the identification 
and development of talent is a key priority for most CEOs (PwC, 2012), one that is 
highly rewarding (Lepak & Snell, 1999); nevertheless, managers often fail to man-
age talent effectively (Collings, 2014). While most previous research has focused 
on the relationship of the human capital dimension with firm performance (for a 
detailed overview, see Crook et al., 2011), paradoxically, the determinants of such 
investment have been less studied (Liu et al., 2014). Tabor et al. (2018) reached sim-
ilar conclusions in their literature review of non-family members in family firms.
In the following sub-sections, we develop a conceptual model that includes the 
antecedents explaining talent management investment, with a specific focus on fam-
ily ownership.
2.1  Talent management
Stemming from the resource-based view (Oliver, 1997), managerial literature (Gal-
lardo-Gallardo et  al., 2015) has identified talent management as the development 
of high-performing and high-potential incumbents in critical organisational roles 
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(Collings, 2014). Talent management research is still in its infancy (Lewis & Heck-
man, 2006); it lacks a clear and consistent conceptual framework (Al Ariss et al., 
2014; Thunnissen et  al., 2013). It focuses on talented people without any specific 
position or organisational boundary (Thunnissen et  al., 2013). With this in mind, 
Sparrow and Makram (2015) state that this phenomenon is about the ‘manage-
ment of talent,’ not the narrower human resource management concerns of talent 
management per se. Indeed, the management of a small group of elite employees 
whose skills are difficult to find and replace (Sparrow & Makram, 2015) may fulfil 
these high-potential employees’ needs and generate favourable attitudes and behav-
iours that can result in superior performance (Collins & Mellahi, 2009; Thunnissen 
et al., 2013). Furthermore, talent management ‘practices may allow high-potential 
employees to become more agile which is necessary in order to compete in a mod-
ern unpredictable business world’ (Khoreva et al., 2017, p. 20). The importance of 
talent management is even more evident in a globalised economy where talent is a 
fundamental source of strategic opportunity (Schuler et al., 2011).
Nevertheless, while scholarly interest in talent management has increased over the 
last decade (Tatoglu et al., 2016), the antecedents to talent management investments 
(i.e., how firms make talent management investment decisions) have remained unex-
plored (Liu et al., 2014). In this context, there are two parallel streams of literature 
that seek to explain the differences in firms’ talent management investments. These 
streams are mostly related to the role of ownership and management composition, 
such as for a family-owned and -managed firm (Neckebrouck et al., 2018), and the 
inherent risks (i.e., adverse selection and moral hazard) associated with recruiting, 
retaining, and promoting human capital (Klein & Bell, 2007), which are related to 
the firm’s level of risk aversion (Cappelli, 2008). We conjecture that these research 
streams converge; hence, ownership identity and firm risk aversion dimensions 
should be simultaneously considered to explore talent management investment.
2.2  Family ownership and talent management
Lajili (2015) argues that the governance structure of a company may be inferred 
through its ownership structure. Family businesses’ governance differs from main-
stream corporate governance in an important aspect: family members may have 
multiple organisational roles (Mustakallio et  al., 2002), allowing them to directly 
or indirectly control managerial decisions by avoiding non-family board members’ 
interference and other investors’ control (Steijivers et  al., 2017). Direct control is 
exercised when family managers directly make the most important decisions (Gallo 
& Sveen, 1991). Indirect control passes through an agency theory channel since 
family boards may effectively replace the CEO, even with a relatively low share in 
ownership (Tsai et al., 2006). Considering both channels (direct and indirect), Riz-
zotti et al. (2017) find that family owners promptly replace an underperforming CEO 
when the CEO is not a family member.
Therefore, as suggested by Tsai et  al. (2006), we can rely on agency theory to 
explain why family-owned firms differ from non-family-owned firms in terms of 
investment in talent management practices. According to this theory, firms incur 
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agency costs to prevent opportunistic behaviour when the decision-making agent 
(the manager) has conflicting interests with the principal (the owner) (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). When there is information asymmetry in the 
labour market, agency conflicts can arise between the principal, either family or 
non-family owners, and the agent, any external non-family applicants, in the form 
of adverse selection and moral hazard problems. There are three main agency the-
ory arguments indicating that family-owned firms are less willing to invest in talent 
management practices.
First, like any other firm, family-owned firms face the traditional challenges of 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Schulze et al., 2002) when dealing with talented 
non-family employees because of goal discrepancies, asymmetric information, and 
bounded rationality between the principal and agent. In non-family firms, the own-
ership–management distinction induces the implementation of talent management 
practices (incurring agency costs) to attenuate adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. Conversely, these agency problems are ‘theoretically’ mitigated by own-
ers’ active monitoring role in family-owned firms (Chua et al., 2009). Family-owned 
firms may rely on social networks to hire employees and control them via close 
contact (Steijivers et al., 2017) to reduce information asymmetries, supervise their 
behaviour, and align their goals. Consequently, these firms are less willing to imple-
ment costly talent management practices.
Second, even though family-owned firms have an apparent advantage over non-
family firms in reducing some agency problems, there are others exclusive to family 
firms. The family logic imprinted on the firm by family ownership generates unique 
asymmetric altruism and self-control problems for family firms (Bernheim & Stark, 
1988; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). This family logic is characterised by a long-term 
investment horizon (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005), high psychological owner-
ship (Pieper, 2010), and social, emotional, and economic investments in the firm 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). These agency problems influence managerial practices 
(Konzelmannet et al., 2006; Pindado et al., 2012) by imposing family-oriented inter-
ests that do not necessarily maximise profit (Basco, 2017; Lippi & Schivardi, 2014) 
or optimise human resources decision-making (Basco & Pérez-Rodríguez, 2011). 
These may include differential treatment of employees (Bandiera et al., 2015; Cai 
et al., 2013; Daspit et al., 2017; Jennings et al., 2018) and management entrench-
ment (Randolph et  al., 2017), which are not aligned with the investment in and 
implementation of talent management practices.
Third, family-oriented goals serve as reverse signalling for potential candidates 
(potential employees). Family firms may consider themselves less professional about 
providing adequate rewards and appropriate incentives to talented candidates (Chris-
man et al., 2017); therefore, they may avoid investing in talent management for less 
efficient, low-potential employees (Krishnan & Scullion, 2017; Lepak & Snell, 
1999). Indeed, talent management investments require high-potential employees to 
be in the talent pool (Collings & Mellahi, 2009). Consequently, family-owned firms 
may perceive talent management practices as an unnecessary drain of wealth and a 
disutility for family members.
Based on these agency theory arguments, family business specificities induce 
family-owned firms to be reticent about investing in professional practices such as 
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talent management. Family ownership has pernicious effects on human resource 
practices (Liu et al., 2014). Neckebrouck et al.’s (2018) results indicate that family 
firms pay their employees 7 per cent less, invest 14 per cent less in off-site employee 
training, and have about 1 per cent more voluntary employee turnover than non-fam-
ily firms do. According to De Kok et al. (2006), firms with family ownership and/or 
management are less likely to adopt professional human resource practices, which 
is the result of both a direct idiosyncratic effect explained by agency theory and an 
indirect effect of organisational characteristics such as firm size and complexity. 
Using a sample of 500 Spanish companies, Sánchez-Marín et al. (2019) find a nega-
tive moderating effect of family involvement on the relationship between the for-
malisation of training practices and firm performance. Similarly, using a sample of 
more than 30,000 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2016, Dal Maso et al. (2020) 
find a negative correlation between family ownership and investment in training and 
development practices, showing that this relationship explains at least half of family 
firms’ lower environmental performance compared with non-family firms.
2.3  Family ownership, risk aversion, and talent management
As one of the main goals of corporate governance is to indicate the organisation’s 
strategic direction, and as family ownership influences the strategic decision of tal-
ent investments (Ceja Barba & Tàpies, 2009; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006), 
there is an ongoing debate about whether being a family firm is an antecedent of 
talent management investment. We continue to rely on the agency theory rationale 
to explore whether investing in talent management practices depends on the inher-
ent risk of managing talent and the principal’s risk aversion level. According to this 
theory, the level of risk aversion influences the principal-agent contract (Eisenhardt, 
1989).
Conventional agency models regard the principal and agent as risk-neutral and 
risk-averse, respectively (Chua et  al., 2009). During the recruitment process, the 
principal has limited knowledge about an employee’s actual abilities (Akerlof, 
1970). While agents know their own capabilities, principals must rely exclusively 
on public information about the former’s talent. As a result, an adverse selection 
problem arises, and risk-neutral principals reward workers according to the aver-
age level of talent in the market. However, some studies have extended this frame-
work to risk-averse principals (Chen et al., 2018; Penno, 1984; Shavell, 1979; Sobel, 
1993), showing that risk aversion causes principals to attach greater importance to 
the worst events, to avoid profit uncertainty (Basov & Yin, 2010). Thus, risk-averse 
firms weigh potential threats due to adverse selection and moral hazard problems1 
more heavily than the potential benefits from investing in and implementing talent 
management practices. Given this, risk-averse firms are less willing than risk-neutral 
firms to invest in talent management.
1 In fact, employees may join rival organisations (Castanias & Helfat, 2001; Coff, 1997), thus increasing 
the recipient firm’s competitiveness and productivity.
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Even though the heterogeneity of family firms (Daspit et  al., 2021), family-
owned firms tend to be more risk-averse than non-family firms (Block, 2012; Hiebl, 
2012; Morck & Yeung, 2003; Sirmon et  al., 2008) because of their idiosyncratic 
characteristics. Their peculiar family specificities (Carney, 2005) affect organisa-
tional resource creation and allocation (Basco, 2015; Minetti et al., 2015), as well 
as the level of risk aversion (Hiebl, 2012; Schulze et al., 2001). Family firms tend 
to be risk-averse because they consider the firm as an inter-generational asset (Gen-
try et al., 2016; Hiebl, 2012). Families invest sizeable private and socio-emotional 
wealth in the firm, and this further increases their risk aversion (Bianco et al., 2013). 
Consequently, having a higher risk aversion may exacerbate adverse selection and 
moral hazard perception related to managing talented employees, thus affecting 
talent management investment. First, the usual adverse selection (principal-agent) 
problem in recruiting talented individuals is further aggravated by the principal’s 
family-oriented goals (Aparicio et al., 2017) that are not necessarily disclosed dur-
ing the hiring process. Second, even when family-oriented goals are in place, they 
may be ambiguous compared with economic goals (Basco, 2017), leaving employ-
ees to pursue their own goals. Consequently, family firms may prefer to use alter-
native practices to monitor their employees, such as active family presence in the 
decision-making process. Based on the above-mentioned arguments, we expect that 
firms’ risk aversion mediates the family ownership–talent management investment 
relationship.2
Consequently, risk-averse family firms invest less in talent management because 
they place greater weight on the worst events related to moral hazard and adverse 
selection, and such risk aversion affects investment in talent management. Accord-
ingly, we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Ceteris paribus, the level of firms’ risk aversion negatively mediates 
the relationship between family ownership and investment in talent management 
practices.
2.4  Risk aversion, talent management investment, and industry competition
In addition to the effect of firms’ risk aversion, we explore the impact of industry 
competition on family ownership and investment in talent management. The level 
of industry competition can erode a firm’s competitive advantage and jeopardise 
its survival (Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008).3 Talent management is a major pri-
ority and provides a competitive advantage for organisations that aim to grow 
2 As a robustness check, we test the interaction term between family firms and risk aversion (modera-
tion analysis reported in the supplementary material A) finding no results. This supports our mediation 
hypothesis.
3 Cucculelli & Micucci (2008), evaluate the impact of founder’s successions on firm’s performance 
before and after the founder steps down. While the main finding of the study is that the inherited man-
agement within a family negatively affects the firm’s performance, they also found that succession nega-
tively affects the performance in sectors where the competition is intense.
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and survive in highly competitive markets (Cappelli, 2008; Fegley, 2006; Lewis 
& Heckman, 2006). Industry competition may change the investment decisions 
of risk-averse firms that weigh negative events more and are more sensitive to 
higher levels of industry competition. Industry competition increases the like-
lihood of losing talented employees who may prefer to join rival organisations 
(Castanias & Helfat, 2001; Coff, 1997), thereby affecting firm competitiveness 
and productivity, resulting in high turnover costs associated with recruiting and 
selecting their replacements. In other words, talented workers with proven ability 
have alternative opportunities; therefore, firms must appropriately reward talent 
to retain them and avoid moral hazard problems.
In this context, firm survival and family control may be threatened (Gómez-
Mejia et al., 2007). Risk-averse firms may then be more willing to increase their 
talent management investment as insurance for sustainability, reducing the invest-
ment gap between family and non-family-owned firms. In contrast, when industry 
competition is low, risk-averse firms are less willing to invest in talent manage-
ment than are risk-neutral firms.
These arguments may also apply to other family firms’ strategic decisions. For 
instance, Calabrò and Mussolino (2013) argue that family firms face opposing 
forces in deciding whether to expand beyond domestic markets. On the one hand, 
they wish to maintain family control and pursue low-risk strategies, remaining 
within the known territory. On the other hand, internationalisation may offer 
them opportunities to grow. Interestingly, when the latter factor surpasses the for-
mer, family firms perform as well as non-family firms.
Following these arguments, we expect Hypothesis 1 to hold only in the context 
of low industrial competition (see Fig. 1). Accordingly, our second hypothesis is 
as follows:
Hypothesis 2 Ceteris paribus, industry competition moderates the mediation effect 
expected in Hypothesis 1. In a low (or high) competitive environment, risk-averse 









Fig. 1  Research Model
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3  Data and methods
3.1  Sample and data collection
The Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) dataset has been used for the present analysis. 
This dataset is based on the World Management Survey and was designed to meas-
ure the quality of managerial practices, specifically, talent management practices. 
Interviews were conducted in 2004 on a sample of 732 medium-sized manufactur-
ing firms located in four countries: France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. A two-step procedure was used for sample selection. First, for each 
country, a sample of representative medium-sized firms (i.e., between 50 and 10,000 
employees, with a median value of 675) was identified. Second, a randomly selected 
subsample was drawn from this initial sample. In this respect, Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2007) drew a sampling frame from each country to represent medium-sized 
manufacturing firms and then randomly chose the order of interviews.4 Accounting 
for missing values, our final sample comprised 640 firms, with an average of 2023 
employees (and a standard deviation of 4246). The number of employees had a left-
skewed distribution, denoting a majority of relatively large firms with formalised 
managerial practices.
The data collection process involved medium-sized rather than small or large 
firms. Indeed, large firms are characterised by a high degree of between-plant het-
erogeneity, making it difficult to obtain a synthetic measure of managerial qual-
ity, whereas public data on small firms are rarely available. Information was tele-
phonically collected without telling the managers that they were being scored. The 
respondents were plant managers, who are typically senior enough to have a percep-
tion of management practices but not as much as to be distant from daily operations. 
The survey responses were corrected using interviewer fixed effects and a stand-
ardised scoring system. On average, the interviews lasted 50 min, and the response 
rate was 54%. This high participation rate resulted from four strategies. First, the 
interview was introduced as a ‘piece of work’ without talking about firms’ financial 
performance or accounting position. Second, the interviews started with less con-
troversial questions about shop-floor operations. Third, interviewers were continu-
ously monitored to incentivise them to contact firms. Fourth, the project received 
the written endorsement of the Banque de France (in France), the Bundesbank (in 
Germany), and the Treasury (in the U.K.). This emphasised the importance of the 
survey, making managers more willing to participate.
A common problem with surveys is that respondents try to infer the interview-
er’s opinion and provide what they consider the ‘correct’ answer instead of the true 
one. To address this issue, interviewers did not mention that managers were being 
scored. Thus, Bloom and Van Reenen used a ‘blind’ scoring technique based on 
a series of open questions specifically designed to accurately classify answers. A 
4 While the Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) dataset is considered the most comprehensive data source for 
talent management practices available online, we acknowledge the limitations arising from the timing as 
well as industry and country selection.
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second problem with surveys is that interviewers may have preconceptions about 
a firm’s performance and thus systematically misclassify answers based on their a 
priori expectations. To mitigate this problem, interviewers did not receive informa-
tion on firms’ financial status or performance before the interview. Moreover, Bloom 
and Van Reenen eliminated interviewer fixed effects because each interviewer ran 
over 50 interviews on average. Finally, because the management quality is associ-
ated with several observable dimensions, they collected additional information on 
the interview process, the manager, and the interviewer’s characteristics.
Bloom and Van Reenen assessed sample representativeness by comparing the 
respondent firms with the non-responding ones. They found no evidence that the 
responders were systematically different from the non-responders. Further, to assess 
the dataset’s internal validity, different plant managers in the same firm were inter-
viewed, and a strong correlation was found between independently collected meas-
ures. Conversely, external validation was conducted by measuring the association 
between managerial practices and firm performance. After augmenting the dataset 
with information on firm accounts and stock market values, they found that manage-
rial practices were correlated with firm productivity, profitability, Tobin’s Q, sales 
growth rate, and survival rate.
3.2  Dependent and independent variables
To measure investment in talent management practices, we used the average z-scores 
of talent management practices related to recruiting talent, instilling a talent mind-
set, creating a distinctive employee value proposition, and retaining talent, as meas-
ured by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). These managerial practices belong to either 
the ‘targets’ or the ‘incentives’ areas. The first dimension measures whether attract-
ing and developing talent is a firm target, whereas the second is related to the exist-
ence of an incentive system through which the firm creates a distinctive employee 
value proposition to retain talented workers. The survey considered both monetary 
and non-monetary incentives, such as training and development, and creating a dis-
tinctive employee value proposition. Therefore, compared with traditional human 
resource management practices, this study’s dependent variable explicitly consid-
ered the existence of an internal talent market. Together with the capacity to identify 
talented workers, the creation of a talent market represents an essential feature of 
talent management.
We focused on three explanatory variables: whether a firm is family-owned, the 
level of a firm’s risk aversion, and the intensity of competition within a given indus-
try. First, there are different definitions of family ownership (see the following lit-
erature review for more details: Basco, 2013; Mazzi, 2011; O’Boyle et al., 2012), 
for this study, we take Miller et al. (2010) recommendations, and in line with our 
theoretical framework, which sustains the importance of family generational owner-
ship involvement to capture firm behaviour and risk, we separated family owner-
ship from lone founder ownership. In this sense, we followed previous studies in 
using a dummy variable that equals one, if the largest shareholder is a single fam-
ily—combined across all family members, second-generation or beyond—and zero 
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otherwise.5 Data on ownership and family generation come from company Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (i.e., SEC) filings, company databases (Compustat 
and ICARUS in the United States, and Amadeus in the United Kingdom, France, 
and Germany), and company websites. In the case of missing data, information was 
supplemented with a telephonic survey for approximately 300 firms.
The second explanatory variable originated from accounting data and was related 
to the firms’ level of risk aversion. To measure corporate risk-taking, we followed a 
common approach by proxying systematic and unsystematic risk with return volatil-
ity estimates (Cheng, 2008; John et  al., 2008; Li et  al., 2013; Miller & Bromiley, 
1990; Nakano & Nguyen, 2012; Wright et al., 2007; Yost, 2018). In line with this 
literature, we used the inverse of the ROCE variance as a proxy for a firm’s relative 
risk aversion.6 John et al. (2008) argue that riskier corporate operations are associ-
ated with more volatile returns to capital. Thus, they proxy for the degree of risk-
taking in firms’ operations using the volatility of corporate returns. In this respect, 
Palmer and Wiseman (1999) find a strong positive relationship between managerial 
risk-taking and organisational risk (captured by the variance of return on assets). 
Moreover, they also find that managerial risk-taking persists over time.
Similarly, using option-implied risk aversion estimates, Bliss and Panigirtzo-
glou (2004) show that agents’ relative risk aversion is negatively related to market 
volatility. A risk-averse agent is an individual ‘preferring lower risk options at the 
expense of returns’ (Wiseman & Gómez-Mejia, 1998, p. 133); therefore, relative 
risk aversion is strongly associated with return volatility. Finally, we may argue that 
ROCE volatility is a reliable proxy for risk aversion, independent of the return-vari-
ance relationship. If expected returns are positively correlated with return volatility, 
modern portfolio theory applies, and more risk-averse firms tend to reduce volatil-
ity at the expense of returns (Copeland & Stapleton, 1993). Conversely, in the case 
of a negative relationship between expected returns and volatility, a poor performer 
increases risk-taking, eventually resulting in further poor performance (Bromiley, 
1991).7
We used the Lerner index as an indirect measure of competition. Bloom and 
Van Reenen define this index as (1  −  profits/sales). The index was calculated as 
7 In the supplementary material B (available online), we further validate the relative risk aversion meas-
ures by showing that the portfolio theory applies in our case.
5 With respect to the definition of the family ownership variable used in our study, we acknowledge it to 
be a very stringent definition of family firms (owned by second generation or beyond). Indeed, there may 
be cases of family firms owned by founders where the second generation is active in leading the Board of 
Directors. While we acknowledge this as a potential limitation, we have ruled out the possibility that our 
effects are unrelated to family ownership. In the supplementary material available online, we use a coun-
terfactual analysis that replaces the family ownership indicator with a dummy variable that equals one if 
the founder is the largest single shareholder and CEO, to show that lone founders are not particularly risk 
averse. Therefore, they invest in talent management as much as other firms. The lack of any mediating 
effect is since, on average, firms owned by lone founders are not more risk-averse than others. Therefore, 
this counterfactual exercise supports the fact that our findings are family ownership specific. Moreover, 
our conclusions also hold when a different dataset is used to replace the family ownership dummy with a 
family management variable.
6 For ease of representation, we standardised the relative risk aversion index.
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an average for the period 1995–1999 for a firm’s country and three-digit industry 
values (excluding the focal firm). The higher the market competition, the higher the 
value of the index. As profits are negatively related to the number of competitors, 
when competition increases, profits tend to disappear, and the Lerner index tends to 
be one.8
Our estimates also considered additional variables that may influence talent man-
agement investment. To control for managerial capabilities, we added the average 
management score (Management score) across the following three managerial areas: 
operational (three practices), performance monitoring (five practices), and target 
settings (five practices). Operational practices are related to the introduction of mod-
ern manufacturing processes (such as lean processes), the rationale for introducing 
these processes, and the documentation of process improvements. Monitoring prac-
tices are related to the capacity to discuss, track, and review performance, and the 
existence of consequence management (that is, making sure that plans are followed, 
and appropriate sanctions and rewards are in place). Finally, the target area involves 
questions that examine whether the goals are balanced (i.e., targets are operational, 
financial, or more holistic), interconnected, stretch, and long-term oriented.
In addition, we consider the number of managers with a Master of Business 
Administration (Managers with MBA) and the percentage of employees with col-
lege degrees (Degree). In our model, we also include other factors of production: 
the stock of physical capital employed (Physical capital), number of employees 
(Number of employees), number of hours worked (Hours worked), and material 
costs (Material costs). Lastly, we add firm age (Firm age) and two dummy variables 
identifying whether a company is listed on a market exchange (Publicly listed com-
pany) or presents consolidated accounts (Consolidated accounts). Table 1 provides a 
detailed description of the main variables used.
Table 2 reports the basic descriptive statistics and unconditional correlation coef-
ficients for the selected set of variables. The z-transformation of the Talent manage-
ment score shows that a symmetric distribution around the mean (− 0.001). Family-
owned firms represent 22.7% of the sample; the Lerner index is concentrated around 
the mean (0.944), and the Relative risk aversion coefficient exhibits a right-skewed 
distribution (-0.035). Apart from the control variables, firms operating in the United 
States represent 42% of the sample, with the remaining fraction almost equally 
divided among France (19%), Germany (19%), and the United Kingdom (20%).
3.3  Econometric analysis
To estimate the mediation effect of risk aversion on the relationship between 
family ownership and talent management, we used a structural equation model 
(SEM). The main advantage of this approach is that we can fit a single model and 
estimate the indirect and total effects by conducting a sensitivity analysis, such as 
8 As a robustness check, we also considered an alternative measure of competition: a self-reported vari-
able (Competition), indicating whether the firm has no direct competitors, fewer than five direct competi-
tors, or five or more direct competitors. Un-tabulated results confirm the validity of our main inference.
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that proposed by Imai et al. (2010). Specifically, we tested the effects of omitted 
variables on the mediation effect. We estimated the following structural model 
(hereafter, firm subscripts are suppressed):
The variables are as described above and in Table 1. X is a matrix of control 
variables, µcs is a set of country-sector dummies capturing idiosyncratic charac-
teristics, and ε is the error term. Equation  (1) is also known as the mediation 
equation: By substituting Relative risk aversion in Eq.  (2) with the right-hand 
side of Eq.  (1), we can divide the relationship between Family ownership and 
(1)Relative risk aversion = 0 + 1Family ownership + X + cs + u
(2)




Family ownership + 
2





Relative risk aversion ∗ Lerner index + X + cs + 
Table 1  Description of variables
* These variables are taken in logs
† Data come from Amadeus (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) and Compustat (the United 
States)
π In France and Germany, material costs are line items in accounts. For the UK, material costs are 
obtained by subtracting total wages from the costs of goods sold. For the US, material costs come from 
the method proposed in Bresnahan et al. (2002)
Variable Description
Talent management Average z-score of talent management practices related to recruiting talent, 
instilling a talent mindset, creating a distinctive employee value proposition 
and retaining talent as measured by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007).
Family ownership Dummy variable taking value 1 if the largest shareholder is a single family 
(combined across all family members, whom are all second generation or 
beyond).
Lerner index (1 − profits/sales), calculated for the period 1995–1999 as the average across 
each firm’s country and three-digit industry (excluding each firm itself).
Relative risk aversion The inverse of the variance of ROCE. For the sake of interpretation, the index 
has been standardized.
Management score Average management score across the following managerial areas: operations 
(3 practices), performance monitoring (5 practices), and targets settings (5 
practices) as measured by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007).
Managers with MBA Percentage of managers with an MBA degree.
Degree* The percentage of employees with a college degree.
Physical capital*† Plant and equipment capital.
Number of employees*† The number of workers employed.
Hours worked* Average hours per week for all employees (managers and non-managers).
Material costs*π The difference between the costs of goods sold and the costs of labor and 
capital (depreciation).
Consolidated accounts Dummy variable taking the value 1 if data refer to consolidated accounts.
Firm age* Firm age.
Publicly listed company Dummy variable the taking value 1 if the firm is publicly listed and 0 other-
wise.
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Talent management into two components: a direct component, captured by β1; 
and an indirect component, passing through the measure of risk aversion, given 
by (α1 * β3).
The indirect component represents the extent to which the relationship between 
family-owned firms and talent management is mediated by their degree of rela-
tive risk aversion and sheds light on our first research question. In other words, it 
assesses the extent to which the relationship between talent management and family 
ownership owes to risk aversion and not to idiosyncratic characteristics of family-
owned firms that flow into the ‘direct’ channel. In addition, we tested whether Rel-
ative risk aversion mediates the relationship between Talent management and any 
explanatory variable by multiplying β3 with the corresponding coefficient of Eq. (1).
The final step of our analysis involved testing the moderation effect of the 
level of competition. In the absence of competition, the estimated mediation 

























 (Goodman, 1960). How-
ever, investment in talent management by risk-averse family-owned firms can vary 
by level of competition. Therefore, given a certain degree of competition, the con-
ditional indirect component becomes ?̂?1𝛽3 + 𝛽4 Lernerindex , and the corresponding 
variance is augmented by the variance of the second addend.
3.4  Sensitivity analysis
As for any other econometric model that does not include a reliable instrumental 
variable, we considered a potential omitted variable bias in our model specification. 
In other words, the a priori existence of an omitted variable correlated with both 
ROCE volatility and talent management investment may not be excluded. Paral-
lelly, the identification of an appropriate instrument is a questionable and challeng-
ing task. Therefore, we conducted a sensitivity analysis to identify possible causal 
inference problems. Following the method of Imai et al. (2010), we simulated the 
effects of a potential confounder on our structural model by generating a variable 
that causes a predetermined degree of correlation between the residuals of Eqs. (1) 
and (2). This methodology allowed us to evaluate the potential strength of the omit-
ted variable bias.
4  Results
4.1  Main results
Table 3 reports the estimates of Eqs. (1) and (2). These two equations represent our 
SEM and test the existence of a mediation effect of risk aversion on the relation-
ship between family firm ownership and talent management. Column 1 of Table 3 
displays the coefficients of Eq. (1); it further indicates that family firms tend to be 
more risk-averse than non-family firms (α1 of 0.177; p < 0.05) (see Hiebl, 2012). By 
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considering the other covariates, we observe that risk-averse firms usually employ 
more workers than other firms. Besides, younger firms exhibit a higher degree of 
risk aversion.
Column 2 of Table 3 reports the estimates of Eq.  (2), that is, the direct effects 
of our covariates on Talent management investment. According to our results, a 
negative relationship exists between risk aversion and talent management practices 
when the level of competition is low (see the coefficient of Relative risk aversion) 
and a positive moderation effect of competition (see the coefficient of Relative risk 
aversion*Lerner Index). This implies that risk-averse firms invest as much as other 
firms in talent management practices only when the competition is high, and tal-
ent management increases firms’ competitiveness. In contrast, when competition is 
low, firms can survive even with a lower investment in talent management practices; 
therefore, risk-averse firms under-invest in these practices.
Column 3 of Table 3 shows the estimates of the indirect mediation effect. The 
indirect effect is obtained by multiplying the coefficients of Eq.  (2) by the coeffi-
cients of Eq.  (1).9 Considering Column 3, we notice that Risk aversion mediates 
the effects of Family ownership, Number of employees, and Firm Age. Whereas 
family firms (compared with non-family firms) and larger firms under-invest in tal-
ent management because of their risk aversion, mature firms tend to invest more 
in talent management because of their lower risk aversion. Evidence on fam-
ily firms is particularly strong in terms of magnitude or statistical significance. 
Finally, Column 4 of Table 3 provides the total effect of our regressors on Talent 
management practices. By considering only the total effect, we observe that the 





] = −0.304, p < 0.1) . Based on our empirical results, we cannot 
reject Hypotheses 1 and 2.
4.2  On the role of competition
Next, we tested whether family firms’ investment in talent management changes not 
only because they are more risk-averse than non-family firms but also because they 
operate in different competitive contexts. In other words, we must consider the mod-
eration channel depicted in Fig. 1. For this purpose, we estimated the total effect of 
Family ownership on Talent management for the three different levels of the Lerner 
index: one standard deviation below the mean, at the mean, and one standard devia-
tion above the mean. As shown in Table 4, a negative effect of Family ownership on 
Talent Management emerges for family firms operating in less competitive markets 
(p < 0.05). The smaller magnitude confirms that only family firms facing a low level 
of competition tend to under-invest in talent management owing to their relatively 
high degree of risk aversion. Conversely, their idiosyncratic characteristics and the 
9 Our primary inference is based on the delta method. However, to ensure comprehensiveness, we have 
also performed two additional tests: a Sobel-test (p < 0.05) and a Monte Carlo test (p < 0.05).
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need for risk-averse firms to invest in talent management when competition is high 
partly compensate for this phenomenon.
4.3  Sensitivity analysis
Using a causal inference analysis, Fig. 2 shows how our main results change in the 
presence of latent confounders, thus inducing residual covariance between the error 
terms of Eqs. (1) and (2) and reports the average causal mediation effect (ACME). 
This allows us to establish the extent to which our estimates may be affected by 
the existence of omitted variables. One could argue that a non-null residual covari-
ance would render the mediation model unidentified. However, the exclusion of the 
Table 4  Total effect of Family ownership on Talent management for different levels of Lerner index
This table provides the total effect of Family ownership on Talent management when the Lerner index is 
one standard deviation below the mean, at the mean and one standard deviation above the mean. Infer-
ence is based on the Delta Method
Significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Total effect St. Error z-Statistics p-value 95% CI
Lerner index (Mean-1 St. Dev) − 0.032** 0.016 − 2.04 0.041 − 0.062 − 0.001
Lerner index (Mean) − 0.012 0.010 − 1.26 0.209 − 0.032 0.007
Lerner index (Mean + 1 St. Dev) 0.007 0.009 0.77 0.442 − 0.011 0.025
Fig. 2  Sensitivity analysis for the indirect (ACME) effect of Family ownership on Talent management
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Relative risk aversion–Talent management path solves the identification problem 
without altering the causal link (Muthén, 2011).
According to Fig. 2, the ACME is negative and statistically significant at the 5% 
level for a wide range of correlation coefficients (ρ). More precisely, the ACME is 
negative and statistically significant for  ∈ [−0.5, 1], and negative but statistically 
insignificant for  ∈ [−0.9,−0.5) . Therefore, for the mediation effect to be statisti-
cally zero, the absolute value of the negative correlation between errors should be 
50% or more. Because the robustness of our results must be interpreted in terms 
of an interval, a certain degree of subjectivity remains. Nonetheless, this sensitivity 
analysis assists us in assessing the potential bias in the interpretation of our findings.
In addition, in the supplementary material available online, we present a series 
of additional robustness checks. First, we extended Eq. (2) to include the interaction 
between Relative risk aversion and both the Lerner index and Family ownership to 
show that risk aversion does not moderate the relationship between family owner-
ship and talent management investment. Second, we proved that the choice to proxy 
relative risk aversion using the inverse of the ROCE variability has both theoretical 
and empirical foundations. Third, to rule out the possibility that our effects were not 
related to family ownership, we also carried out a counterfactual analysis in which 
we replaced the family ownership indicator with a dummy variable that equals one if 
the founder is the largest single shareholder and CEO, and zero otherwise. Accord-
ing to our results, lone founders are not more risk averse than non-family firms; 
therefore, they invest in talent management as much as other firms do. Finally, we 
used a different dataset to test the external validity of our results. This dataset con-
tains information on family management and provides an alternative measure of risk 
aversion (i.e., the volatility of return on assets). However, with respect to Bloom and 
Van Reenen’s (2007) dataset, this alternative dataset considers training and develop-
ment practices instead of talent management practices.
4.4  Pre‑ and post‑contractual talent management practices and family 
ownership
To corroborate the idea that both adverse-selection issues and moral hazard issues 
are relevant, we divided talent management practices into two components: pre-con-
tractual and post-contractual. Specifically, we measured the former as the z-score 
of talent management practices related to recruiting talent, and the latter was meas-
ured using the average z-score of talent management practices related to instilling a 
talent mindset, creating a distinctive employee value proposition, and retaining tal-
ent as measured by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). Table 5 shows the estimates of 
Eqs. (1) and (2) for the pre- and post-contractual practices (Panels A and B, respec-
tively) with the Lerner index.10 As shown, the overall effect of Family ownership 
on Talent management is negative and statistically significant only for pre-contrac-
tual practices (p < 0.05). The same effect becomes statistically less significant for 
10 For the sake of representation, we report the estimates with Lerner index. Results are robust even 
when replace Lerner index with the measure of Competition. Results are available upon request.
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post-contractual practices because family firms with net risk aversion tend to invest 
in talent only once a worker is part of the company.
Table 5  Pre- and Post-contractual practices and family ownership (Lerner index)—structural equation 
model
This table reports the ML estimates of the Eq. (1) and (2). Inference is based on a Satorra–Bentler adjust-
ment, thus standard errors are robust to non-normality. We test the significance of indirect effect (IE) 
using the following estimates: Delta method (p < 0.05), Sobel (p < 0.05) and Monte Carlo (p < 0.05)
Significance: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4)
Mediation Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Panel A: Pre-contractual 
practices
Dependent variable: Relative risk aversion Pre-contractual Pre-contractual Pre-contractual
Family ownership 0.185** − 0.021 − 0.388** − 0.409**
(0.078) (0.072) (0.164) (0.175)
Lerner index 0.104 0.104
(0.556) (0.556)
Relative risk aversion − 2.103*** − 2.103***
(0.052) (0.052)




Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Post-contractual 
practices
Dependent variable: Relative risk aversion Post-contractual Post-contractual Post-contractual
Family ownership 0.177** 0.095** − 0.365** − 0.270*
(0.075) (0.044) (0.154) (0.160)
Lerner index 0.286 0.286
(0.305) (0.305)
Relative risk aversion − 2.066*** − 2.066***
(0.019) (0.019)




Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 640 640 640 640
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5  Discussion
Although family firms benefit from formal human resource practices (Chrisman 
et  al., 2017; Jaskiewicz et  al., 2017), anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests 
that family firms fail to effectively manage human resources (Ceja Barba & Tàpies, 
2009; Neckebrouck et al., 2018). Our study addresses this research gap by investi-
gating why and when family firms invest less in talent management. Specifically, we 
focus on talent management investment owing to its ability to increase a firm’s com-
petitive advantage in today’s complex global economy (Chatterjee, 2016).
Our results indicate that the degree of risk aversion mediates the relationship 
between family-owned firms and the level of investment in talent management as 
a decision coming from the top governance level. More specifically, when indus-
try competition is low, risk-averse family-owned firms tend to under-invest in tal-
ent management practices with respect to non-family firms. This occurs because the 
main risk connected with talent management in the case of a non-competitive con-
text is hiring employees who are not talented, while talented workers, because of 
the limited competitors, are less likely to abandon their jobs even when the firm’s 
talent management investment is low. In this situation, investment in talent man-
agement is less effective, and, relative to risk-neutral firms, risk-averse firms may 
decide to under-invest in talent management practices to avoid squandering money. 
In contrast, when industry competition increases, talented employees may prefer to 
join rival organisations; thus, talent management becomes an insurance against los-
ing talented workers (Castanias & Helfat, 2001; Coff, 1997). Thus, any difference 
between family-owned and non-family-owned firms disappears in the face of intense 
industry competition.
While previous studies proved that a firm’s ownership structure affects human 
capital investment (Liu et al., 2014), our study explains why and when it happens. 
Our findings are consistent with Memili et  al.’s (2013) findings that family firms 
are less likely to offer incentives to non-family members than non-family firms by 
explicitly determining that variations are caused by corporate risk aversion and 
industry competition. Second, our study also contributes to the agency theory lit-
erature by explicitly measuring organisational risk rather than making assumptions. 
While most previous studies on family firms and risk attitudes (Hiebl, 2012) use 
‘family’ characteristics of the firm as a proxy for risk aversion, we directly measured 
it using the inverse of the variance of the ROCE (Palmer & Wiseman, 1999). Addi-
tionally, relying on agency theory and considering a firm’s risk aversion, industry 
competition, and family ownership as antecedent variables for talent management, 
this study extends previous research by addressing the call made by Wright et  al. 
(2014) and Tabor et al. (2018) to better understand the antecedents of human capital 
investments, given the positive effects of measuring, training, and rewarding prac-
tices on firm performance.
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6  Conclusions
This study contributes to the current debate on human resource practices, specifi-
cally talent management practices in family- and non-family-owned firms. Using 
Bloom and Van Reenen’s (2007) data and a mediation–moderation model, we 
arrived at the following results. First, compared to non-family firms, family-owned 
firms exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion, choosing corporate operations associ-
ated with less volatile returns to the capital employed. Second, risk-averse firms tend 
to under-invest in talent management practices within a non-competitive market. 
Third, in competitive contexts, risk-averse family firms invest as much as non-family 
firms in talent management. Finally, although these results hold for both pre- and 
post-contractual practices, family businesses invest more in retaining talented work-
ers than recruiting them.
7  Limitations and future research
Our study also has some limitations which represent opportunities for future 
research. First, in explaining why family and non-family firms differ in their talent 
management investments, we presumed firm size. While Bloom and Van Reenen’s 
(2007) dataset, which focuses specifically on medium-sized enterprises, is reliable, 
we were unable to test whether our results hold for very large or very small family-
owned firms. Therefore, future studies should complement our findings by investi-
gating any potential spill-over effects related to talent management investment in the 
omitted firm sizes. Secondly, the positive ‘direct’ influence of family ownership on 
investment in post-contractual talent management practices—net of a firm’s level 
of risk aversion—unfolds a potential area for subsequent study. Accordingly, future 
research should unpack the direct channel effect by disentangling the different com-
ponents of family firms’ residual effects.
Additionally, based on family firms’ characteristics, future research could inves-
tigate the effects of labour supply determinants on family-owned firms’ investment 
in talent management. For instance, since family objectives dominate professional 
practices in favour of nepotism and other non-competitive practices, talented can-
didates may be reluctant to look for a job in family-owned firms. Therefore, future 
research may investigate the impact of a negative self-selection mechanism on fam-
ily firms’ investment in talent management. Nevertheless, this argument does not 
invalidate our study for two reasons. First, the self-selection mechanism is more 
related to the direct channel than to the mediation channel. Second, even in the case 
of possible interactions between self-selection and risk aversion, self-selection is 
particularly relevant in highly competitive contexts where the number of firms is suf-
ficiently high to generate a tight labour market and workers have plenty of external 
opportunities in the bargaining process. This implies that our estimates of the medi-
ation effect are eventually downward-biased, and our results may be even stronger in 
the case of no self-selection.
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Third, our study relies on Bloom and Van Reenen’s (2007) dataset to explore for-
mal talent management practices. In some cases, family-owned firms may rely on 
informal processes in which employees directly learn from the entrepreneur/founder 
(Block et al., 2018; Neubaum et al., 2017). While we acknowledge this as a limita-
tion of our study, we believe that it represents a promising avenue for future research. 
Fourth, since our results show a partial mediation of risk aversion, the remaining 
variance not explained by the mediation (direct channel) opens the possibility to 
integrate other theoretical arguments such as behavioural agency theory. A potential 
line of future research is to consider the reference point to measure the loss aversion 
of the firm. Applying behavioural agency theory in the specific case of family firms 
when non-economic goals might also be important, one can assume that the risk 
behaviour of the principals would change based on their reference points and the 
extent to which goals are threatened.
Finally, future studies should address the general categorisation between family-
owned and non-family-owned firms by considering different types of family firms 
and a more recent dataset containing information on talent management practices. 
This research line could help in understanding the extent to which risk aversion 
mediates the relationship with talent management investment across heterogeneous 
family firms. All family firms may not have the same attitude towards risk, and this 
may affect their behaviour during crises. Moreover, future research can also extend 
our analysis to non-manufacturing sectors as well as developing countries. Indeed, if 
risk aversion influences family firms’ investment in talented workers, we may expect 
a negative correlation between the proportion of family firms in a country and its 
economic growth. In this case, reforms devoted to promoting competitive markets 
can alleviate this problem.
Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https:// doi. 
org/ 10. 1007/ s10997- 021- 09599-1.
Funding Open access funding provided by Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna within the 
CRUI-CARE Agreement.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is 
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission 
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen 
ses/ by/4. 0/.
References
Akerlof, G. (1970). The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488–500.
Al Ariss, A., Cascio, W. F., & Paauwe, J. (2014). Talent management: Current theories and future 
research directions. Journal of World Business, 49(2), 173–179.
 R. Basco et al.
1 3
Aparicio, G., Basco, R., Iturralde, T., & Maseda, A. (2017). An exploratory study of firm goals in the 
context of family firms: An institutional logics perspective. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 
8(3), 157–169.
Arrow, K. J. (1973). Higher education as a filter. Journal of Public Economics, 2(3), 193–216.
Bandiera, O., Guiso, L., Prat, A., & Sadun, R. (2015). Matching firms, managers, and incentives. Journal 
of Labor Economics, 33(3), 623–681.
Basco, R. (2013). The family’s effect on family firm performance: A model testing the demographic and 
essence approaches. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 4(1), 42–66.
Basco, R. (2015). Family business and regional development. A theoretical model of regional familiness. 
Journal of Family Business Strategy, 6(4), 259–271.
Basco, R. (2017). Where do you want to take your family firm? A theoretical and empirical exploratory 
study of family business goals. BRQ Business Research Quarterly, 20(1), 28–44.
Basco, R., & Pérez Rodríguez, M. J. (2011). Ideal types of family business management: Horizontal fit 
between family and business decisions and the relationship with family business performance. 
Journal of Family Business Strategy, 2(3), 151–165.
Basov, S., & Yin, X. (2010). Optimal screening by risk-averse principals. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical 
Economics, 10(1), 1–25.
Baù, M., Pittino, D., Sieger, P., & Eddleston, K. A. (2020). Careers in family business: New avenues 
for careers and family business research in the 21st century. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 
11(3), 100379.
Bernheim, B., & Stark, O. (1988). Altruism within the family reconsidered: Do nice guys finish last? 
American Economic Review, 78(5), 1034–1045.
Bertrand, M., & Schoar, A. (2006). The role of family in family firms. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
20(2), 73–96.
Bianco, M., Bontempi, M. E., Golinelli, R., & Parigi, G. (2013). Family firms’ investments, uncertainty 
and opacity. Small Business Economics, 40(4), 1035–1058.
Bliss, R., & Panigirtzoglou, N. (2004). Option-implied risk aversion estimates. The Journal of Finance, 
59(1), 407–446.
Block, J. H. (2012). R&D investments in family and founder firms: An agency perspective. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 27(2), 248–265.
Block, J. H., Fisch, C. O., Lau, J., Obschonka, M., & Presse, A. (2018). How do labor market institutions 
influence the preference to work in family firms? A multilevel analysis across 40 countries. Entre-
preneurship Theory and Practice. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1177/ 10422 58718 765163
Bloom, N., & Van Reenen, J. (2007). Measuring and explaining management practices across firms and 
countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), 1351–1408.
Bloom, N., Lemos, R., Sadun, R., Scur, D., & Van Reenen, J. (2014). The new empirical economics of 
management. Journal of the European Economic Association, 12(4), 835–876.
Bromiley, P. (1991). Testing a causal model of corporate risk taking and performance. Academy of Man-
agement Journal, 34(1), 37–59.
Cai, H., Li, H., Park, A., & Zhou, L. A. (2013). Family ties and organizational design: Evidence from 
Chinese private firms. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(3), 850–867.
Calabrò, A., & Mussolino, D. (2013). How do boards of directors contribute to family SME export inten-
sity? The role of formal and informal governance mechanisms. Journal of Management & Govern-
ance, 17(2), 363–403.
Cappelli, P. (2008). Talent management for the twenty-first century. Harvard Business Review, 86(3), 
1–7.
Carney, M. (2005). Corporate governance and competitive advantage in family-controlled firms. Entre-
preneurship Theory and Practice, 29(3), 249–265.
Castanias, R. P., & Helfat, C. E. (2001). The managerial rents model: Theory and empirical analysis. 
Journal of Management, 27(6), 661–678.
Ceja Barba, L., & Tàpies, J. (2009). Attracting talent to family-owned businesses: the perceptions of 
MBA students. (IESE Business School Working Paper No. 815). Barcelona. Retrieved from https:// 
doi. org/ 10. 2139/ ssrn. 14829 62.
Chatterjee, J. (2016). Strategy, human capital investments, business domain capabilities, and perfor-
mance: A study in the global software services industry. Strategic Management Journal, 38(3), 
588–608.
Chen, P., Li, S., & Ye, B. (2018). Risk-sharing matching and moral hazard. Bulletin of Economic 
Research, 70(2), 165–174.
1 3
Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management?…
Cheng, S. (2008). Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Econom-
ics, 87(1), 157–176.
Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., & Litz, R. A. (2004). Comparing the agency costs of family and non-family 
firms: Conceptual issues and exploratory evidence. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 28(4), 
335–354.
Chrisman, J. J., Devaraj, S., & Patel, P. C. (2017). The impact of incentive compensation on labor produc-
tivity in family and non-family firms. Family Business Review, 30(2), 119–136.
Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., & Bergiel, E. B. (2009). An agency theoretic analysis of the professionalized 
family firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(2), 355–372.
Coff, R. W. (1997). Human assets and management dilemmas: Coping with hazards on the road to 
resource-based theory. Journal of Management, 22(2), 374–402.
Collings, D. G. (2014). Toward mature talent management: Beyond shareholder value. Human Resource 
Development Quarterly, 25(3), 301–319.
Collings, D. G., & Mellahi, K. (2009). Strategic talent management: A review and research agenda. 
Human Resource Management Review, 19(4), 304–313.
Copeland, L. S., & Stapleton, R. C. (1993). Information, interest rates, and the volatility of asset prices. 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 3(1), 99–115.
Crook, T. R., Todd, S. Y., Combs, J. G., Woehr, D. J., & Ketchen, D. J. (2011). Does human capital mat-
ter? A meta-analysis of the relationship between human capital and firm performance. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 96(3), 443–456.
Cucculelli, M., & Micucci, G. (2008). Family succession and firm performance: Evidence from Italian 
family firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(1), 17–31.
Dal Maso, L., Basco, R., Bassetti, T., & Lattanzi, N. (2020). Family ownership and environmental perfor-
mance: The mediation effect of human resource practices. Business Strategy and the Environment, 
29(3), 1548–1562.
Daspit, J. J., Chrisman, J. J., Ashton, T., & Evangelopoulos, N. (2021). Family firm heterogeneity: A 
definition, common themes, scholarly progress, and directions forward. Family Business Review, 
34(3), 296–322.
Daspit, J. J., Madison, K., Barnett, T., & Long, R. G. (2017). The emergence of bifurcation bias from 
unbalanced families: Examining H.R. practices in the family firm using circumplex theory. Human 
Resource Management Review, 28(1), 18–32.
De Kok, J. M., Uhlaner, L. M., & Thurik, A. R. (2006). Professional HRM practices in family owned-
managed enterprises. Journal of Small Business Management, 44(3), 441–460.
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 
14(1), 57–74.
Fegley, S. (2006). Talent management survey report. Alexandria: SHRM Research.
Gallardo-Gallardo, E., Nijs, S., Dries, N., & Gallo, P. (2015). Towards an understanding of talent man-
agement as a phenomenon-driven field using bibliometric and content analysis. Human Resource 
Management Review, 25(3), 264–279.
Gallo, M. A., & Sveen, J. (1991). Internationalizing the family business: Facilitating and restraining fac-
tors. Family Business Review, 4(2), 181–190.
Gentry, R., Dibrell, C., & Kim, J. (2016). Long-Term orientation in publicly traded family businesses: 
evidence of a dominant logic. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 40(4), 733–757.
Gómez-Mejía, L. R., Haynes, K., Núñez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K., & Moyano-Fuentes, J. (2007). Soci-
oemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from Spanish olive oil 
mills. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(1), 106–137.
Goodman, L. A. (1960). On the exact variance of products. Journal of the American Statistical Associa-
tion, 55(292), 708–713.
Govindarajan, V. (1988). A contingency approach to strategy implementation at the business-unit level: 
Integrating administrative mechanisms with strategy. The Academy of Management Journal, 31(4), 
828–853.
Hauswald, H., Hack, A., Kellermanns, F. W., & Patzelt, H. (2016). Attracting new talent to family 
firms: Who is attracted and under what conditions? Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 40(5), 
963–989.
Hiebl, M. R. W. (2012). Risk aversion in family firms: What do we really know? The Journal of Risk 
Finance, 14(1), 49–70.
Imai, K., Keele, L., & Yamamoto, T. (2010). Identification, inference and sensitivity analysis for causal 
mediation effects. Statistical Science, 25(1), 51–71.
 R. Basco et al.
1 3
Jaskiewicz, P., Block, J. H., Combs, J. G., & Miller, D. (2017). The effects of founder and family own-
ership on hired CEOs’ incentives and firm performance. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
41(1), 73–103.
Jennings, J., Dempsey, D., & James, A. (2018). Bifurcated H.R. practices in family firms: Insights from 
the normative-adaptive approach to stepfamilies. Human Resource Management Review, 28(1), 
68–82.
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and own-
ership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360.
John, K., Litov, L., & Yeung, B. (2008). Corporate governance and risk-taking. The Journal of Finance, 
63(4), 1679–1728.
Khoreva, V., Vaiman, V., & Van Zalk, M. (2017). Talent management practice effectiveness: Investigating 
employee perspective. Employee Relations, 39(1), 19–33.
Klein, S. B., & Bell, F. A. (2007). Non-family executives in family businesses: A literature review. Elec-
tronic Journal of Family Business Studies, 1(1), 19–37.
Konzelmann, S., Conway, N., Trenberth, L., & Wilkinson, F. (2006). Corporate governance and human 
resource management. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 44(3), 541–567.
Krishnan, T. N., & Scullion, H. (2017). Talent management and dynamic view of talent in small and 
medium enterprises. Human Resource Management Review, 27(3), 431–441.
Lajili, K. (2015). Embedding human capital into governance design: A conceptual framework. Journal of 
Management & Governance, 19(4), 741–762.
Lepak, D. P., & Snell, S. A. (1999). The human resource architecture: Toward a theory of human capital 
allocation and development. Academy of Management Review, 24(1), 31–48.
Lewis, R. E., & Heckman, R. J. (2006). Talent management: A critical review. Human Resource Manage-
ment Review, 16(2), 139–154.
Li, K., Griffin, D., Yue, H., & Zhao, L. (2013). How does culture influence corporate risk-taking? Journal 
of Corporate Finance, 23, 1–22.
Lippi, F., & Schivardi, F. (2014). Corporate control and executive selection. Quantitative Economics, 
5(2), 417–456.
Liu, X., van Jaarsveld, D. D., Batt, R., & Frost, A. C. (2014). The influence of capital structure on stra-
tegic human capital: evidence from U.S. and Canadian firms. Journal of Management, 40(2), 
422–448.
Mazzi, C. (2011). Family business and financial performance: Current state of knowledge and future 
research challenges. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 2(3), 166–181.
Memili, E., Misra, K., Chang, E. P., & Chrisman, J. J. (2013). The propensity to use incentive compensa-
tion for non-family managers in SME family firms. Journal of Family Business Management, 3(1), 
62–80.
Miller, K. D., & Bromiley, P. (1990). Strategic risk and corporate performance: An analysis of alternative 
risk measures. Academy of Management Journal, 33(4), 756–779.
Miller, D., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2005). Managing for the long run: Lessons in competitive advantage 
from great family businesses. Harvard Business Press.
Miller, D., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2006). Family governance and firm performance: Agency, Steward-
ship, and Capabilities. Family Business Review, 19(1), 73–87.
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., & Lester, R. H. (2010). Family and lone founder ownership and strategic 
behaviour: Social context, identity, and institutional logics. Journal of Management Studies, 48(1), 
1–25.
Minetti, R., Murro, P., & Paiella, M. (2015). Ownership structure, governance, and innovation. European 
Economic Review, 80, 165–193.
Morck, R., & Yeung, B. (2003). Agency problems in large family business groups. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, 27(4), 367–382.
Mustakallio, M., Autio, E., & Zahra, S. A. (2002). Relational and contractual governance in family firms: 
Effects on strategic decision making. Family Business Review, 15(3), 205–222.
Muthén, B. (2011). Applications of causally defined direct and indirect effects in mediation analysis 
using SEM in Mplus (Technical Report). Los Angeles: Muthén & Muthén.
Nakano, M., & Nguyen, P. (2012). Board size and corporate risk taking: further evidence from japan. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(4), 369–387.
Neckebrouck, J., Schulze, W., & Zellweger, T. (2018). Are family firms good employers? Academy of 
Management, 61(2), 553–585.
1 3
Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management?…
Neubaum, D. O., Thomas, C. H., Dibrell, C., & Craig, J. B. (2017). Stewardship climate scale: An assess-
ment of reliability and validity. Family Business Review, 30(1), 37–60.
O’Boyle, E. H., Pollack, J. M., & Rutherford, M. W. (2012). Exploring the relation between family 
involvement and firms’ financial performance: A meta-analysis of main and moderator effects. 
Journal of Business Venturing, 27(1), 1–18.
Oliver, C. (1997). Sustainable competitive advantage: Combining institutional and resource-based views. 
Strategic Management Journal, 18, 697–713.
Palmer, T. B., & Wiseman, R. M. (1999). Decoupling risk taking from income stream uncertainty: A 
holistic model of risk. Strategic Management Journal, 20(11), 1037–1062.
Penno, M. (1984). Asymmetry of pre-decision information and managerial accounting. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 22, 177–191.
Pieper, T. M. (2010). Non solus: Toward a psychology of family business. Journal of Family Business 
Strategy, 1(1), 26–39.
Pindado, J., Requejo, I., & de la Torre, C. (2012). Do family firms use dividend policy as a govern-
ance mechanism? Evidence from the Euro zone. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
20(5), 413–431.
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) (2012). 15th Annual Global CEO Survey: Delivering results: Growth 
and value in volatile word [Report]. London: PwC.
Randolph, R., Wang, Z., & Memili, E. (2017). Entrenchment in publicly traded family firms: Evidence 
from the S&P 500. Long Range Planning, 51(5), 736–749.
Rizzotti, D., Frisenna, C., & Mazzone, R. (2017). The impact of family owners’ monitoring on CEO 
turnover decisions and the role of trust. Journal of Management & Governance, 21(3), 599–621.
Sánchez-Marín, G., Meroño-Cerdán, Á. L., & Carrasco-Hernández, A. J. (2019). Formalized HR prac-
tices and firm performance: An empirical comparison of family and non-family firms. The Interna-
tional Journal of Human Resource Management, 30(7), 1084–1110.
Schuler, R. S., Jackson, S. E., & Tarique, I. (2011). Global talent management and global talent chal-
lenges: Strategic opportunities for IHRM. Journal of World Business, 46, 506–516.
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. (2002). Altruism, agency, and the competitiveness of 
family firms. Managerial and Decision Economics, 23(4/5), 247–259.
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N., & Buchholtz, A. K. (2001). Agency relationships in family 
firms: Theory and evidence. Organization Science, 12(2), 99–116.
Shavell, S. (1979). Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship. The Bell Journal of 
Economics, 10(1), 55–73.
Shaw, J. D., Park, T.-Y., & Kim, E. (2013). A resource-based perspective on human capital losses, HRM 
investments, and organizational performance. Strategic Management Journal, 34(5), 572–589.
Sirmon, D. G., Arregle, J., Hitt, M. A., & Webb, J. W. (2008). The role of family influence in firms’ 
strategic responses to threat of imitation. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 32(6), 979–998.
Sobel, J. (1993). Information control in the principal-agent problem. International Economic Review, 34, 
259–269.
Sparrow, P. R., & Makram, H. (2015). What is the value of talent management? Building value-driven 
processes within a talent management architecture. Human Resource Management Review, 25(3), 
249–263.
Spence, M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355–374.
Steijvers, T., Lybaert, N., & Dekker, J. (2017). Formal human resource practices in family firms. Journal 
of Family Business Management, 7(2), 151–165.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1975). The Theory of “Screening,” education, and the distribution of income. The Ameri-
can Economic Review, 65(3), 283–300.
Tabor, W., Chrisman, J. J., Madison, K., & Vardaman, J. M. (2018). Non-family members in family firms: 
A review and future research agenda. Family Business Review, 31(1), 54–79.
Tatoglu, E., Glaister, A. J., & Demirbag, M. (2016). Talent management motives and practices in an 
emerging market: A comparison between MNEs and local firms. Journal of World Business, 51(2), 
278–293.
Thaler, R., & Shefrin, H. (1981). An economic theory of self-control. Journal of Political Economy, 
89(2), 392–406.
Thunnissen, M., Boselie, P., & Fruytier, B. (2013). A review of talent management: Infancy or adoles-
cence? The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 24(9), 1744–1761.
Tsai, W. H., Hung, J. H., Kuo, Y. C., & Kuo, L. (2006). CEO tenure in Taiwanese family and non-family 
firms: An agency theory perspective. Family Business Review, 19(1), 11–28.
 R. Basco et al.
1 3
Wiseman, R. M., & Gómez-Mejía, L. R. (1998). A behavioral agency model of managerial risk taking. 
Academy of Management Review, 23(1), 133–153.
Wright, P. M., & Kehoe, R. R. (2008). Human resource practices and organizational commitment: A 
deeper examination. Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources, 46(1), 6–20.
Wright, P. M., Coff, R., & Moliterno, T. P. (2014). Strategic human capital: Crossing the great divide. 
Journal of Management, 40(2), 353–370.
Wright, P. M., Kroll, M., Krug, J. A., & Pettus, M. (2007). Influences of top management team incentives 
on firm risk taking. Strategic Management Journal, 28(1), 81–89.
Yost, B. P. (2018). Locked-in: The effect of CEOs’ capital gains taxes on corporate risk-taking. The 
Accounting Review, 93(5), 325–358.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
Rodrigo Basco is a Professor at the American University of Sharjah (AUS)–United Arab Emirates and 
holds the Sheikh Saoud bin Khalid bin Khalid Al-Qassimi Chair in Family Business. He is the Board 
Chairman of STEP Project Global Consortium and Associate Editor of Journal of Family Business Strat-
egy. He is also visiting professor at IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca (Italy). His research focuses 
on entrepreneurship, management, and regional development with a special interest in family firms, and 
he has taught economics, management, and family business courses at universities in Spain, Chile, and 
Germany.
Thomas Bassetti is an associate Professor of Economic Policy at the Department of Economics and Man-
agement "Marco Fanno" (University of Padua, Italy) where he teaches Macroeconomics and Monetary 
and Fiscal Policy. He holds a Ph. D. in Economics at the University of Pisa. His research interests involve 
environmental economics, human capital, political economy and applied econometrics. He published in 
international journals such as Economic Inquiry, Environmental and Resource Economics, R&D Man-
agement, Empirical Economics, Journal of Socio-Economics, Journal of Family Business Strategy, Busi-
ness Strategy and the Environment, Frontiers in Psychology and Economia Politica.
Lorenzo Dal Maso is an associate Professor of Financial Analysis at the Alma Mater Studiorum Univer-
sity of Bologna, where he teaches Financial Analysis and International Accounting. Before joining the 
University of Bologna, he was an assistant professor at the Erasmus School of Economics (The Nether-
lands) and the ESSEC Business School (France). His research focuses on bank financial reporting, the 
impact of ESG information on firm performance, market reaction, and investors behaviour. He published 
in international journals such as Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of Business Ethics, Journal 
of Accounting and Public Policy, Journal of Financial Stability, Business Strategy and the Environment, 
Journal of Family Business Strategy.
Nicola Lattanzi is a full Professor of Business Administration at IMT (Institutions Markets Technologies, 
https://www.imtlucca.it/en) School for Advanced Studies Lucca where he teaches Strategy and Manage-
ment for Complex Systems; at the University of Pisa, he teaches Strategy and Governance of Family 
Business. He is pro-rector for the IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca in Innovation, Relations with 
Institutions and Enterprises. From 2007 to 2010 he served as scientific director of the Master of II level 
in Management for Family Business (University of Pisa). He is President of the Scientific Committee of 
Neuroscience Lab Intesa https://nslab.imtlucca.it/en/ .He was Board member of Bank of Italy in Lucca; 
President of Gaia S.p.A., a national water service company; Board member of Cassa di Risparmio di 
Pistoia e Lucchesia, an Intesa Group bank; Board member of Intesa Sanpaolo Real Estate Owned Com-
pany, an Intesa Group company; Vice President of SICI SGR S.p.A. He serves, entrepreneurial families 
in Merger and Acquisition with a particular focus on the Chinese market, private financial companies, 
and public institutions. He works as non-executive director. He is the author of more than eighty publica-
tions including books and scientific journals.
